Is time travel into the past metaphysically possible

 

Reading List:

1. Introduction: The nature of metaphysics
2. W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (CUP 1984), Introduction.
   M. Loux, Metaphysics (Routledge 1998), Introduction.
   E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (OUP 2002), Introduction.
   G. Schlesinger, Metaphysics (Blackwell 1983), ch. 1.
   P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008.

 

2. Do we have a soul?

Dualism and materialism

5. Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§1-5. (on Blackboard)
   R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (2e, OUP 1997), Introduction (pp. 1-16).
   P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics (4e, Westview 2014), pp. 223-230.
6. Hawthorne, Cartesian dualism, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Persons: Human and Divine (OUP 2007), 87-98.
7. Taylor, Metaphysics, 4e (Prentice Hall 1992), ch. 2.

 

Appearances

6. Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §6.
   A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §2
   E. Olson, The appearance and the evidence, §1.
   D. Bell, Husserl (Routledge 1990), ‘Conscious bodies’, pp. 162-168 (208-214 in the print

 

Traditional arguments for dualism

1. Plantinga, Materialism and Christian belief, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman , eds., Persons: Human and Divine (OUP 2007), Part 1 (pp. 99-118)
2. van Inwagen, Metaphysics, pp. 230-245.
   E. Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§7, 8
   A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §§5-7. J. Foster, The Immaterial Self (Routledge 1991), pp. 202-212.
3. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, ch. 8.
   B. Williams, Descartes (Penguin 1978), ch. 4.
   D. Zimmerman, Two Cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul. American

Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 217-226.

 

New arguments for dualism:

17. Segal, Why I believe I am a soul, §§8-17.
    E. Olson, Fuzzy edges and amputations.

    A. Segal, Materialism is metaphysically messy or morally absurd. E. Olson, The Paradox of Increase. Monist 89 (2006): 390-417.

18. van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell 1990), §§2, 3, 8, 9.

 

Arguments for materialism

16. Olson, Why I don’t believe in souls, §§10-16.
    A. Segal, A sane soul-hypothesis and the sane materialist alternative, §§3-8
    further reading
    D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 2e (Blackwell 2007), ch. 1.
    P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics, pp. 260-265.
    P. Smith and O. R. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind (CUP 1986), ch. 4, ‘Difficulties for

the dualist’.
C. McGinn, The Character of Mind, 2e (OUP 1997), ch. 2, ‘Mind and body’.
E. J. Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (CUP 2000), ch. 2, ‘Minds, bodies

and people’.
R. Taylor, Metaphysics, 4e (Prentice Hall, 1992), chh. 2-4.

 

 

3. Time

Time’s Passage
Olson, The passage of time, in R. LePoidevin, et al., eds., Routledge Companion to

Metaphysics (Routledge 2009). Available at

<https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.528498!/file/RCM.pdf>.
van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 4e, ch 4, Temporality, pp. 71-81.

 

2011. Dyke. 2011. Metaphysics of time. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
      R. LePoidevin. 2003. Travels in Four Dimensions (OUP 2003), ch. 8, Does Time Pass? A. N. Prior, Changes in events and changes in things, in his Papers on Time and Tense

(OUP 1968), repr. in LePoidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., The Philosophy of Time

(OUP 1993)
K. Seddon, Time: A Philosophical Treatment (Croom Helm 1987), 3-25.

 

Objections to the dynamic view

2008. M. E. McTaggart, The unreality of time, in R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., The Philosophy of Time, OUP 1993, 23-34 (original work 1927). Also reprinted as ‘Time: an excerpt from The Nature of Existence’ in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2e, Blackwell 2008.

van Inwagen, Metaphysics, ch 4, pp. 81-106.
Craig Bourne, When am I?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002).

Olson, The Rate of Time’s Passage, Analysis 2009.
G. Schlesinger, Aspects of Time (Hackett 1980), ch. 3. Seddon, Time, 44-70.

 

Fate:

1. Taylor, Fate (ch. 6 of Metaphysics, 4e, Prentice Hall 1992, 54-67).

van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (OUP 1983), ch. 2, Fate.

133. Ryle, It was to be, in his Dilemmas (CUP 1954)
     Seddon, Time, 105-133.
     van Inwagen, What does an omniscient being know about the future? In J. Kvanvig,

ed., Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 1, OUP 2008, available at <https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Omniscient_Being.pdf>.

Thank goodness that’s over! essential reading
A. N. Prior, Thank goodness that’s over, Philosophy 34, 1959, 12-17. Available online

via library catalogue.
D. H. Mellor, Real Time II (Routledge 1998), sections 4.1-4.2 (39-42).

1. Hare, Time–Emotional asymmetry. In H. Dyke and A. Bardon, eds., A Companion

to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley 2013. Schlesinger, Aspects of Time, ch. 2 Seddon, Time, 26-43.

 

The appearance of time’s passage
P. Horwich, Our sense of passage (§2.6 of Asymmetries in Time, MIT Press 1987,

33-36).
Mellor, Real Time II, §§1.1-1.3 (pp. 7-11), 2.1-3.2 (19-32).

 

Time travel:

152. Lewis, The paradoxes of time travel, American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976): 145-152.
153. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics, OUP 2002, ch. 18.
     D. H. Mellor, Real Time II, ch. 12
     van Inwagen, Changing the past, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5 (2010).

Available at  <http://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Changing_the_Past.pdf>.